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A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes Without the State? A
Critique of Legalization Within the State
Under the Premises of Globalization
LARRY CATA BACKER*
ABSTRACT

Recent efforts have sought to theorize the legalization of the social
and economic sphere that is undiminished by time. Though the context
has changed over time, the project remains the same-to embed behavior
control within a network of mandatory proscriptions attached in some
authoritative way to the state. Corporate social responsibility has been
bound up in corporate codes of behavior and relatedprivate governance
standardssystems. In that form, it serves as a key site for the evolution of
legalization and legitimacy in governance. That evolution appears to
take corporate social responsibility from its twentieth century formalist
rigidity into something of a bridge between the political and social
sphere. This essay considers the legalizationproject and its challenge to
the logic and legitimacy of law and the dangers-for state and business
enterprise-that flow from the fundamental ideological premises that
appear to make this legalizationproject within the state both necessary
and inevitable. These dangers include the misdirection of labelingdismissing nonlaw as necessarily illegitimate, the obliteration of the
fundamental construct of and constraintsinherent in the corporateform,
the error of conflating regulation with law, the unintended consequence
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of subverting law through the incorporation of a societal element in
lawmaking, the error of denaturing the societal element of corporate
codes, and the production ofperversity through the formalism of law that
masks inverted power relations between powerful enterprises and weak
states. Paradoxically,perhaps, the project of legalizationevidences how a
love of ancient custom, in this case the customs and patterns of the postWestphalian law-state, remains, while power shifts to those, enterprises
included, that have brought about a revolution in the state and in the
meaning of legalization in a new world order that has yet to be revealed.
I. CONTEXT: THE PROBLEM OF LEGALIZATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES.

The robust development of the project of legalization within the logic
of globalization has proceeded with increasing ferocity over the last
several decades.' The object of this work is to bring globalization, and
especially its regulatory aspects tied to economic enterprises operating
across borders, back into law and legal systems. 2 To that end, law and
legal systems are traditionally understood as sourced in and as an
expression of the legitimate exercise of authority by states whose
governments are lawfully constituted.3 Transnational regulatory

1. See generally LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith L. Goldstein, Miles
Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., 2002) (examining global
changes in politics and law); David Levi-Faur, The Political Economy of Legal
Globalization: Juridification, Adversarial Legalism, and Responsive Regulation. A
Comment, 59 INT'L ORG. 451 (2005) (discussing a study of global legal and regulatory
change).
2. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests:
InternationalLegalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141 (2002);
LAW AND

LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

(Christian Britsch

& Dirk

&

Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).
3. See generally Luis de Garay, What Is Law?, 16 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261 (James J.
Kearney, trans., 1941); Hans Kelsen, What Is the Pure Theory of Law?, 34 TUL. L. REV.
269 (1960); Roscoe Pound, What Is Law?, 47 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1940); Joseph Raz, Legal
Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972). Those still invested in the
question of what is law, many of whom are in the political and academic elites, tend to
treat the issue within a larger discourse. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (discussing law within the discourse of legal
pluralism); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986) (same); Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What Is Law? A
CoordinationModel of the Characteristicsof Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471 (2012)
(discussing law within the discourse of coordination and public choice); ANNE MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (discussing law within the discourse of
networked systems); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal
Pluralism, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 1443 (1992) (discussing law within the discourse of
societal constitutionalism).
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systems are meant to mimic and then perhaps work within or be
4
absorbed into aggregated or harmonized domestic legal orders. It is to
that effort that much by way of international law in the economic
5
sphere is devoted.
Yet legalization ought not to be understood solely in its
international aspects-that is, as a cluster of methodologies that set
legal standards in or through international legal instruments. Efforts to
legalize emerging transnational normative consensus on behavior
within the legal structures of contemporary domestic legal ordering
have been equally energetic. This is a national project rather than an
international one, though it draws on the powerful instinct to
harmonize approaches among states recognizing the distinctiveness of
6
This project focuses on both legal
national legal traditions.
transformation through the exercise of judicial authority (especially in
common law states),7 and reinterpretation of customary legal principles
8
(especially, though not exclusively, in civil law states). Its object is
transnational in the sense that its foundation requires the willingness

4. See Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging
Transnational Regulatory Systems, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 121, 121.
5. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Essay: Considering a Treaty on Corporations and
Human Rights: Mostly Failures but with a Glimmer of Success (Aug. 28, 2015)
(unpublished essay) (describing how treaty negotiations are affected by changing power
dynamics of globalization), available at httpJ/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2652804.
6. On its process within both nationla and international law making understood in a very
broad sense, see, GRAF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (Hart 2010).

7. See, e.g., Mara Theophila, Note, "Moral Monsters" Under the Bed: Holding
Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859 (2011) (examining whether international
or domestic law should control a court's determination in Alien Tort Statute cases); David
L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality:A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 MD. J. INT'L L. 241
(2013) (discussing the different international and domestic rationales for judicial decisions
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality); Roger P. Alford, Human Rights
After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of TransnationalTort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J.
1089 (2014) (reframing human rights violations as international wrongs resolved through
transnational tort litigation).
8. See, e.g., Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, False Dawn for CSR? Shifts in
Regulatory Policy and the Response of the Corporateand FinancialSectors in Britain, 15
CORP. GOVERNANCE 68 (2007) (presenting a reflexive model of corporate social
responsibility in Britain); Charis Kamphuis, CanadianMining Companies and Domestic
Law Reform: A Critical Legal Account, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1459 (2012) (offering a legal
account of mining law reform efforts in Canada); Ruben Zandvliet, Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting in the European Union: Towards a More Univocal Framework, 18
COLUM. J. EUR. L. F. 38 (2011) (examining the legal framework for corporate social
responsibility in the European Union).
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of supranational actors to embrace international standards within their
own governance communities and to incorporate these standards as a
sort of informal law.9 It should then be a small step to transform the
informal law of the enterprise into a part of the formal law of a domestic
legal order and to seek to enforce these standards by resorting to the
commonplace legal rules of states that might be moved to construct
some connection between events that transpire in transnational space
and their own domestic legal orders.' 0
It is in this second sense of legalization that Anna Beckers,11 in her
profoundly important and provocative book Enforcing Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes, looks out across more than a century and across
two germinal events-one a fire in a sweatshop in New York1 2 and the
other a building collapse of a sweatshop in Bangladesh. 13 These
germinal events, undiminished by time across a century of substantial
turmoil, serve as a basis to theorize, and quite persuasively, the
continuity of a project that has as its object the legalization of the social
and economic sphere. From both germinal events one hears the same
cry, a cry out for something, some reaction, some effort to ensure that
each event would be the last of its kind-the way political elites sought
to cabin war after the First World War, what had then been sometimes
nicknamed "the war to end all wars." 14 But in place of a legal
architecture to end impunity in aggression, one is now confronted with a
great effort to construct a similar architecture to end all impunity in the
economic sphere.
9. See, e.g., Karin Buhmann, Corporate Social Responsibility: What Role for Law?
Some Aspects of Law and CSR, 6(2) CORP. GOVERNANCE 188, 188 (2006).
10. See, e.g., ANDREAS RiHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW
AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2015).
11. ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON
GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAw (2015).
12. See generally DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA

(2003) (describing the devastating 1911 fire that destroyed the Triangle Shirtwaist factory
in New York's Greenwich Village).
13. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Are Supply Chains TransnationalLegal Orders?:
What We Can Learn from the Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse, 1(1) U.C. IRVINE J.
OF INT'L, TRANSNAT'L, & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (recounting the 2013 collapse of the
Rana Plaza, an eight-story commercial building, in Bangladesh).
14. See Erik Sans, WWI Centennial: "The War to End All Wars, Menmtal Floss (Aug.
16, 20914 (available http://mentalfloss.com/article/58411/wwi-centennial-war-end-allwars) ("For this is now a war for peace. It aims straight at disarmament. It aims at a
settlement that shall stop this sort of thing for ever. Every soldier who fights against
Germany now is a crusader against war." Quoting H.G. Wells, The War that Will End
War, THE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 1914)). In a similar way one sees each of the victims of
enterprise human rights abuses as a crusader against impunity in corporate
irresponsibility in the human rights wrongs that are a aconseqeunce of their operations.
See generally, BASAK CALI, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 57 (2010).
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Though the context is quite different, the project remains the
same-to embed behavior control within a network of mandatory
15
proscriptions attached in some authoritative way to the state. Yet its
very different context, rather than its ultimate object, that poses the
challenge. It is grounded in a set of basic premises: that law embedded
within the domestic legal orders of states with legitimately established
16
that
governments is the most authoritative form of regulation,
authentic remedies must be embedded within domestic legal orders of
7
legitimately constituted states, ' and that law across jurisdictions can be
harmonized in part because it reflects universal values, or can be made
18
to be coherent, at least at some reasonable level of generality.
But these premises produce contradiction within the emerging
context in which they might be applied to the overall project of
legalization within the state. Those contradictions might be understood
as touching on the political, social, and economic contexts in which
regulatory systems are increasingly embedded. The political context is
globalization and its resituating of the state (or perhaps currently all
but the most powerful of them) as perhaps not the sole occupant of the
19
apex of political and social power in the world. The social context is
rule systems being developed by private actors. These private actors
20
organizations
nongovernmental
include primarily corporations,
22
2
But also included are
(NGOs), 1 and public-private hybrid actors.

-

15. Beckers, supra note 11, at 306-63.
16. See Larry CatA Backer, The EmergingNormative Structures of TransnationalLaw:
Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders, 31 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L.
(forthcoming 2017), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038103.
17. See generally R6gis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and
Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 203 (2010) (discussing lower legal
expectations of corporations as a "legal person").
18. See, e.g., David Bilchitz, The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty 15
(Nov. 30, 2014) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2562760.
19. See, e.g., Richard L. Dixon, The Challenge & Complexities of Nation-State
Sovereignty in the Era of 21st Century Internationalism 2-4 (June 15, 2011) (unpublished
article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886727.
20. See generally Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals:Company
Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination (explaining how
multinationals' corporate codes react to the disappearance of traditional actors due to the
globalization), in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND:
PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION (Rainer Nickel ed.,

2010).
21. See, e.g., Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalizationof Private Governance: How
Business and Nonprofit OrganizationsAgree on TransnationalRules, 18 GOVERNANCE 589
(2005) (examining how private actors like NGOs make their own rules and standards that
acquire transnational authority).
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public actors, most effectively within the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 23 and the apparatus of the U.N. Human
Rights Council. 24 The economic context is the business enterprise
unconstrained by borders, political or otherwise. 25 These efforts have
produced not just more conventional efforts to extend the jurisdiction of
law to the societal sphere, but also efforts to transform the nature and
basis of law and legal systems outward to better account for the reality
of lawmaking within, between, and beyond the state, 26 and within
transnational legal orders. 27
This applies with particular force in the context of the regulation of
economic activity, especially organized economic activity across
borders. 28 Corporate social responsibility, 29 bound up in corporate codes
of behavior and related private governance standards systems, 30 thus
serves as a key site for the evolution of legalization and legitimacy in
governance, from its 20th century formalist rigidity into something of a

22. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the
State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global
Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011) (explaining how the rise of
transnational corporations create governance systems in which public and private actors
are integrated stakeholders).
23. See generally Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (May 25, 2011) (committing forty-two
countries to standards
of corporate
behavior),
available at httpJ/dx.doiorg/
10.1787/9789264115415en
24. See generally U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm'r, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (June 16, 2011) (setting forth guidelines
for states on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises), availableat http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples
BusinessHREN.pdf.
25. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
TransnationalRegulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2008).
26. See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 6, at 11 (2010).
27. See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory
Shaffer eds., 2015) (discussing institutionalization of legal orders across national
boundaries and the ensuing implications for law and social ordering).
28. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Trends,
Challenges, and Opportunities,22 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 153, 154 (2015).
29. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, TransnationalLaw:
The United Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a
Harbingerof Corporate Social Responsibility as InternationalLaw, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV.287-389 (2006)(discussing the contemporary challenges of corporation social
responsibility as an object and source of law).
30. On corporate codes and their regulatory implications, see Gunther Teubner, SelfConstitutionalizingTNCs? On the Linkage of "Private"and "Public" Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011).
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bridge between the political and social sphere.3 1 And for this purpose,
the state, like the corporation before it, is reduced to a nexus of
connections within the structures of governance. But its reduction has
an additional character as well, for the state is not merely reduced to a
meeting point of governance webs, but it simultaneously changes its
character from a public to a private economic actor operating within
global private markets. 32 In addition, the state is a member of a
community of states whose own power and governance must struggle
with issues of democratic legitimacy now several steps removed from
33
any direct connection with popular power or accountability.
But even as the project of code legalization develops what may well
become a most sound theory rationalizing the legalization of societal
norms within the state, even as this project produces the best case for
the reform of law within the state, and even if this best case theory for
legalization within conventional parameters is convincingly both
plausible and necessary to achieve the foundational aims of legitimacy,
enforcement, and authority in governance, I look on this quite worthy
and necessary project with dread. It is a dread born of an assumption
that Beckers is right in the sense of crafting theory pointing the way to
a possible, indeed plausible, set of approaches that might be undertaken
in the service of that project should states be self-conscious enough in
the project of self-preservation that they undertake them and coordinate
the undertaking among them. It is a dread informed, in part, by a
contemporary application of Aristotle's insights about a more ancient
relation between law and the state. The first suggests the difficulty of
legal
where
especially
systems,
law
in
instrumentalism
instrumentalism may create a tension with the normative or societal
norms of the subject population: "For a law derives all its strength from
custom, and this requires [a] long time to establish; so that, to make it
an easy matter to pass from established laws to other new ones, is to
weaken the power of laws." 34 The other suggests the relationship
between law and power. "For the people do not easily change, but love
their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one
31. See,

e.g.,

Paz

Estrella

Tolentino,

Transnational Rules for

Transnational

Corporations: What Next?, in GLOBAL INSTABILITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 177 (John Grieve Smith & Jonathan Michie eds., 1999).
32. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese
Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11 (2010).

33. See, e.g., Patrizia Nanz, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalisation of
Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 59 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-

Ulrich Petersmann, eds., 2006).
34. ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 62 (William Ellis trans., 1895).
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thing takes the place of another; so that the ancient laws will remain,
while the power will remain in the hands of those who have brought
about a revolution in the state." 35 To make law, then, within a changed
context requires that law itself be unmade. That is, law must be
reconstituted to fit within an environment for which it was not
developed.
These insights apply, I believe, with equal force to the constitution
of a law for corporate codes, and provide the foundation for my thesis:
the move to reconstitute law within a legalization project threatens the
underlying foundations of the current law-state, and this can threaten
the authority of law and of the state. The victory for law that is finely
crafted through the legalization project may well undermine the
foundation of the very system in the service of which legalization is
undertaken. Paradoxically, perhaps, the project of legalization evidences
how a love of ancient custom, in this case the customs and patterns of
the post-Westphalian law-state, remains while power shifts to those,
enterprises included, that have brought about a revolution in the state
and in the meaning of legalization in a new world order that has yet to
be revealed. This is not to suggest that Beckers' project serves the forces
of dissipation or that the project will help usher in an age of chaos or
anarchy. 36 Rather, it points out that law, and the state system on which
much of its legitimacy is founded, may not be able to overcome its own
contradictions in the face of new technologies of power or the
internationalization of politics and economics, in which the state may no
longer claim, even within its territory, a monopoly of power. 37
35. Id. at 134.
36. Mos6s Naim answers the question, "who is in charge" by suggesting that no one is
anymore. See generally Moisis NAM, THE END OF POWER: FROM BOARDROOMS TO
BATTLEFIELDS AND CHURCHES TO STATES, WHY BEING IN CHARGE ISN'T WHAT IT USED TO

BE (2014). But no one ever was ... completely. This impulse has been particularly acute
in the context of the internationalization of political economy. See generally DAVID C.
KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (2001); LESLIE SKLAIR, THE
TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS (2000); KEES VAN DER PIJL, TRANSNATIONAL CLASSES

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998). Every emergence of power systems, including the
contemporary power system founded on states, was at one point characterized by anarchy
(no ordering principle) which was then eventually ordered to some extent (in the case of
states by the international system especially after 1945) in legal harmonization, the logic
of which inevitably weakens the integrity of its component parts. See, PHILIP ALLOTT, THE
HEALTH FO NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 301-304 (Cambridge, 2002).

The same may well be expected of the polyglot system of fractured power that appears to
be emerging in this century, though most of us today will be dead long before it may be
disciplined by some ordering principle or other. See, Larry Cati Backer, The Structural
Characteristicsof Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and
Polycentricity, 17(2) TILBURG L. REV. 177-199 (2012).
37. For further discussion of this idea, see Larry CatA Backer, Fractured Territories
and Abstracted Terrains: Human Rights Governance Regimes Within and Beyond the
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This essay, then, serves to briefly sketch out what I see as the
danger-for the state and for the business enterprise-that flows out of
the fundamental ideological premises that appear to make legalization
within the state necessary and inevitable, when it may be neither but
for the blinders of the ideology that appears to make them so.38 I offer
this in an effort to excavate under the fairly thick walls of the ideology
of law and state, not to undermine this ideology but to offer a view of the
world from beyond its walls. And so, when I look across the century
from the Triangle Shirtwaist fire of 1911 to the Rana Plaza building
collapse of 2013, I might see the process of legalization in a
substantially different light. I might see that process from 1911 to 2013
as one in which the state comes to play a substantially reduced role and
from which legalization itself might be made possible only by the state's
absence. But I might also see a process in which a legalization of the
social and economic sphere may be indeed proceeding, but not in an
unbroken line nor in the shadow of the state.
II. FROM AN IDEOLOGY OF THE STATE TO THE LAW OF CORPORATE CODES

I start by positing two quite distinct views of the relationship
between the state and law, both of which were forged in the fires of the
Anglo-European revolutionary period from 1640 to 1917. The embrace of
either one of these views, or their infinite variants, tends to
fundamentally shape the context in which the project of theorizing codes
can take place. I then consider how shifting from the dominant
contemporary view of state-law fusion to one that posits the autonomy
of law might allow for the possibility of alternative approaches.
We have had centuries to think about political life in
terms of the nation, and as any glance at the raft of
books on globalization will confirm, old habits die hard.
Certainly the vast majority of thinking in the postwar
State, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61 (2016); Larry CatA Backer, Governance
Polycentrism or Regulated Self-Regulation Rule Systems for Human Rights Impacts of
Economic Activity Where National, Private, and International Regimes Collide, in
CONTESTED REGIME COLLISIONS: NORM FRAGMENTATION IN WORLD SOCIETY 198 (Kerstin

Blome et al. eds., 2016); and Larry CatA Backer, Transnational Corporations'Outward
Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc.,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805 (2013).
38. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview
(reviewing the extent of contemporary reticence to embrace any "governance without
government" framework that strays too far from the all-encompassing embrace of the
state system and public power), in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87 (Giunther Handl et al. eds., 2012)
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era .. . was done in profoundly national terms. No other
terms were available. Since the end of the Cold War,
however, the idea of a polity founded through markets
has become much more obvious, easier to consider.3 9
The possibilities of a politics detached from the state provide a
means of retuning to the forms of earlier relationships between law and
governance organs. 40 But it also points to its re-emergence in other
forms. 41 These are then used to consider the character of the corporate

code legalization project in a distinct light. To that end I consider
several of the key premises underlying the code legalization project.
A. Ideologies of the Law-State.
The struggles of the post-Westphalian period to theorize and
implement a new model of state organization 42 profoundly affected the
framework within which analysis of governance became possible. 43
Though a large variety of state theory has emerged since 1640,44

virtually all of them share the same foundational characteristics. These
foundations are, in the West at least, two strains of Enlightenment era

39. DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN A
TIME OF DISCONTENT 33 (2004); see also id. at 37 ("As a way of actually doing politics,

however, the substitution of economic integration for ideological enthusiasm, of personal
satisfaction for political passion, was the most important development of the twentieth
century.").
40. See PAOLO GRossI, MITOLOGIAS JURIDICAS DA MODERNIDADE (2004) ("[Alntes
existia o direito; o poder politico vem depois. Tentando com essa afirmado, aparentemente
surpreendente, salientar que, na cidade medieval, o direito repousa nos estratos profundos
e duradouros da sociedade como se fosse uma ossada secreta, estrutura escondida dessa."
["Law existed before, afterwards came political power. I attempt with this apparently
surporsing statement to note that, in the medieval town, law resided in the deepest and
mopst enduring strata of society as if it were a secret skeleton, its hidden structure."]).
41. See generally Gunther Teubner, Exogenous Self-Binding: How Social Systems
Externalise Their Foundational Paradoxes in the Process of Constitutionalization
(reviewing the concept of the. constitution from a socio-legal perspective), in
TRANSCONSTITUTIONALISM (Giancarlo Corsi et al. eds., 2015).
42. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999).
43. See generally Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal
System: The Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2004) (explaining
how the rise of private rights and duties under national and international law, and how
those rights and duties are enforced globally, mark the end of the Westphalian state
system).
44. See, e.g., David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Theories of Global Governance: Strategic Contestation in Global Issue Arenas, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 432 (A. Crane et al. eds., 2008)
(discussing different theories of the state).
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ideologies that produced sometimes profoundly distinct notions of the
value of government: the necessity of government to law and the
relationship of the state to the individual. 45 Both are grounded in the
ancient concept of popular consent, now understood as infinitely
malleable. 46 And consent is tied to an aggregation of people who
constitute themselves within a territory as a political unit distinct from
other territorially differentiated communities.
On the one hand, consent can be understood as the expression of the
popular will, made manifest through government and expressed in law
enacted through this apparatus of state. 47 In this construct, law is
impossible in the absence of government. Government provides the
incarnation of the popular will, which is itself the manifestations of the
best interests of the individuals now come together within a political
community.48 Government is a source of protection, and obedience to
49
government is a first principle of active engagement with the state.
The protection of that manifestation of the general will is the highest

45. See, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, Reifying Law-Government, Law and the Rule of Law
in Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 521, 522-23 (2008).
46. On the notion of popular consent see, for example, JOHN LOCKE, THE Two
TREATISES

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

(1689);

JEAN-JACQUES

ROUSSEAU,

THE

SOCIAL

CONTRACT (M. Cranston trans., 1950) (1762). For modern variations of popular consent
and state theory see, for example, Kevin Gregg, 'Text 'Revolution' to Vote": Social Media's
Effect on Popular Consent and Legitimacy of New Regimes, 31 B.U. INT'L L.J. 315 (2013)
(discussing modern variations of popular consent and state theory); Levy & Kaplan, supra
note 44.
47. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 801, 880 (1993).
48. Consider Article 20 of the German Basic Law: "(1) The Federal Republic of
Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All state authority is derived from
the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and
through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies. (3) The legislature shall be
bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice. (4)
All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional
order, if no other remedy is available." Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
[Constitution] May 23, 1949, art. 20. Also see discussion of popular will as it relates to
state power in Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions:Internationaland Religious
TransnationalConstitutionalismin the 21st Century, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 11, 20-21 (2008).
49. These ideas are usually associated with Rechtsstaat notions in its various
incarnations in European jurisprudence and constitutional theory. See, e.g., Ricardo
Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule fo Law and Its Implications for the European
Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 240-271 (2010). Not so much reduced
to its absurdist critique-rule by law-but as a manifestation of the binding connection
between people and government organized to protect the mass of people from the
individual usurpation of the organs of state through the organizing principles of law and
authenticated through lawmaking rules that reinforce the collective character of
government. Discussed in RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWEARD RULE
OF LAW 27-54, 126-87 (Cambridge, 2002).
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order of systemic protection-process, legality, and a commitment to a
basic set of substantive rights form the core of this approach to
government and law. This is an approach that found its most congenial
home in continental Europe and Latin America of the last century.5 0 It
remained a vibrant part of Japanese rule of law discourse.51 A variation
of this approach underlies Marxist-Leninist political theory and state
organization. 52
On the other hand, consent can be understood as a means of
organizing a community of similar interests for the protection of specific
values (in the Anglo-American
world, of property) and the
operationalization of popular custom and traditions.5 3 In this construct,
government is consequential, something that is necessary to ensure
protection but is not otherwise invested with any inherent power or
character. 54 As a site for the assertion of power against individual
interest, government is viewed with suspicion and framed in a way that
ensures the smallest interference with individual privilege, understood
within the structures of custom and tradition to which the community
adheres, may be defended against encroachment.5 5 At its limit, this
form of consent permits defiance of the governmental apparatus itself to
defend the founding interests of the community itself.5 6 Consent and

50. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in ARGUING ABOUT LAW 181, 182
(Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009); Barry R. Weingast, The Political
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. L. REV. 245, 252-53
(1997).
51. See, e.g., Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the
United States and Japan, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 64(1990).
52. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 10 (2002).

53. See LOCKE, supra note 46; THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 40 (James Madison).
54. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed").
55. This proposition has both a legal and a political character. For its legal character,
see, EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 'HIGHER LAW' BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 72-89 (Cornell U. Press, 1955) ("In other words, the problem is not how the common
law became law, but how it became higher, without at the same time ceasing to be
enforceable through the ordinary courts even within the field of its more exalted
jurisdiction" Id., 24). For its political character, see, ROBERT A. DAHL, " A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137-145 (U. Chicago Press, 1956) ('A central and guiding thread of
American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which
all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some
cruicial stage in the process of decision").
56. See, e.g., M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82
YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1973); cf. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND
OTHER ESSAYS 277 (1993).
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adherence to the government is disciplined by ensuring that all are
equal before the law (that, in many cases, remains a work in progress, of
course) and that the law is firmly anchored in custom as the lived set of
consensual practices of the community. Government is thus both a
source of protection and the space within which joint efforts for
improvement can be undertaken. Government is understood as limited
in the scope of its power and is itself constrained by law, including the
higher law of the state (the subject of so-called natural, religious, or
constitutional law).5 7 The organs of government specified therefore may
make law, but law is not attached to government nor entirely derived
from it.58 This is an approach most notable in premodern England and
its colonies, and a variation of this form prevails in the United States,
though for how much longer is hard to say.
Consent, in whatever form it takes, and the normative and
procedural constraints of state, government and law, are themselves
framed by and managed through that malleable concept-the rule of
law.59 Though deeply contested as a principle and concept, the notion of
rule of law suggests a mechanism through which the legitimacy of law is
preserved as a device for coercing obedience. This embraces the process
basis of rule of law. That process basis of rule of law also contains
within it the limitations on discretion in the application of law--either
by administrators or by the courts. But rule of law also points to
normative limitations-that is, constraints on the power of the
governmental apparatus, or of the ultimate representational body of
political power (e.g., communist parties), in the exercise of their
lawmaking power. To that end, rule of law also embodies a set of
normative constraints-constraints that effectively limit the power of
law over itself. In democratic states, those constraints may be found in
national normative principles and those portions of international
60
In Marxist-Leninist
principles embedded therein from time to time.
57. See generally, EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) (explaining natural law's shaping of government and
society).
58. See Backer, supra note 45, at 522.
59. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 198-

203 (10th ed. 1961) ("It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance
of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power ... Englishmen are ruled by
the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he
can be punished for nothing else. It means, again, equality before the law or the equal
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law
courts; the 'rule of law' in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or
others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals").
60. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] arts. 1-20, translation at http://gesetze-iminternet.de/englischgg/index.html.
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states, those constraints may derive from the founding ideology.6 1 In
any case, rule of law and its subsequent effect on legalization is to some
extent

culturally
63

specifiC 62

within

broader

global

normative

conversation.
It is within this context that the legalization project is projected. So
contextualized, legalization means to invoke traditional or emerging
techniques of national political governance in the service of the
management of the economic sphere-and especially management of the
effects of the activities in the economic sphere on national interests in
the social, cultural, and political spheres. In a process similar to that
invoked by international law and domestic constitutional orders, 64 the
legalization project fractures the process of consent and accountability
precisely because it seeks to embed, within a traditional system of lawstate construction, an entirely new element. That element-the
societally constructed governance frameworks of enterprises, which may
well embrace global views and which may reflect consensus of a
community quite distinct from the political community within which its
parameters might be legalized-fractures consent in a radical way. But
it preserves its critical systemic quality-not as a compilation of
autonomous rules but as a rule system. These do not necessarily require
attachment to a state, or to the political power, but they do require
systemicity. 65 Corporate codes of conduct are not the political expression

of the state but the societal expression of the enterprise. As such,
corporate codes embody the views and assume the characteristics of the
end product of a consensus process not wholly aligned with that of
states within which the provisions of the code are to be given legal
effect. It displaces the democratic principle of state legitimacy with
functionally derived consent categories.
Legalization in the transnational sphere may also produce
movement toward juridification. Juridification might be understood as
the shift of political discussion from the legislative and executive

61. XIANFA art. 3, § 1 (2007) (China).
62. See Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Rules:
The Foundationsof the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON.
659, 660-61 (2007).

63. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the
"Rule ofLaw", 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2275-80 (2003).
64. See generally Mattias Kumm, DemocraticConstitutionalism Encounters International
Law: Terms of Engagement (explaining how constitutional ideas migrate from international
law to domestic law), in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
2007).
65. Cf. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 3 (Anders Wedberg trans.,

1945) ("Law is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having the kind of
unity we understand by a system.").
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function to the judicial function. That is, juridification suggests that the
direct connection between either law and the legislature, or law and
tradition, is increasingly mediated by and through the juridical
66
apparatus, itself sometimes well insulated from popular democracy.
But juridification applies not merely to shifts in the locus of lawmaking
and applying within domestic legal orders. It also suggests an emerging
form of cross-border communication among jurists, whose engagement
might create mechanisms for the harmonization of law through
67
That shift, in turn, produces a
networked-based decision-making.
further shift from the self-referencing domestic legal order to an
international juridified legal order.68 That is, the domestic legal orders
of states might no longer be read as a coherent and autonomous whole,
but rather as a contextualized expression of globalized approaches to
69
as
norm and technique mediated through the judiciary -and
70
resistance to these techniques.
There is a third way of theorizing consent and the construction of
the political order. That path suggests not merely the separation of law
from the apparatus of state, but also the passive role of the state in the
construction of law that is left to a democratic process beyond the state
organs itself.7 1 It is founded on the notion that legal instrumentalism is
itself antidemocratic and that it is the functional aggregation of the
facts of life that provide the basis for law-the ancient customs and
72
liberties of a people now transposed to a postmodern age. There are at
least two well-known variations: The older one, which provided much
grist for Carl Schmitt and his kind, posits custom and social norms
66. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 100-48 (2004).

-

67. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of
InternationalLaw is Domestic (Or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327,
335 (2006); cf. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 957, 959 (2005) ("[TJhe mechanism that allows states to make commitments to
adhere to their promises is their interest in preserving reputation, or their fear of
retaliation. It is not adjudication.").
68. See Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure
Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722 (2006).
69. See David Sugarman, From Unimaginable to Possible: Spain, Pinochet and the
Judicializationof Power, 3 J. SPANISH CULTURAL STUDS. 107, 116 (2002) (describing the
"Garz6n effect").
70. See Larry CatA Backer, Harmonizing Law in an Era of Globalization
Convergence, Divergence, and Resistance: An Introduction and Analysis, in HARMONIZING
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND RESISTANCE 3, 6

(Larry CatA Backer, ed., 2007).
See, e.g., CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 6, at 76-80.
72. The rise of the new lex mercatoria provides a case in point. See generally Ralf
Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria:Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447 (2007).
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without limit, but, as a corollary, suggests that communal borders may
be drawn in any way and to keep anyone out. 7 The other, also in some
sense ancient, posits a set of law above laws, either as natural or
theological law, which serve as meta-taboos. 74 In these frameworks the
legislature acquires a vestigial role, and the force of the state is centered
on administration.
The project of legalization acquires substantially different meaning
depending on which of these fundamental premises of the law-state is
invoked. And that meaning is further refined depending on the level of
juridification assumed within the parameters of the ideological starting
point for legalization. The point, of course, is that the usually
unexamined foundational parameters of the organization of power
within the current framework-in which political power is privileged, in
which the state is the basic organizing principle of political power, in
which such political power is legitimated only when exercised by or
through the mechanisms of popular consent (itself an ideological
construct), and in which such expression is made through law-tend to
mask the critical difficulties of embedding corporate social (or societal)
obligations within this framework.
That difficulty is compounded where, as is the case in contemporary
society, there is no identity of "place" between corporate entity and the
state, where the nature of such obligations may be contextually distinct
among states, where there is no identity between the field of operation
of enterprise activity and that of the state, and where law itself might
be better understood as a commodity or as a factor in the construction of
global production chains. To speak to legalization, then, requires either
a micro analysis-that is, to speak solely to the ability of a state to
73. See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 1985) (explaining that legal order
ultimately rests upon the decisions of the sovereign and focusing on the relationships
among political leadership, the norms of the legal order, and the state of political
emergency); CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (G. L. Ulmen trans., 2003) (describing the origin of the Eurocentric
global order, its specific character and its contribution to civilization, the reasons for its
decline at the end of the 19th century, and prospects for a new world order); CARL
SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004) (arguing that only
a presidential regime subject to few practical limitations can ensure domestic security in a
highly pluralistic society); Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl
Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception"Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1825 (2000) (outlining modern readings of Schmitt); Mark Antaki, Carl Schmitt's
Nomos of the Earth, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 317 (2004) (book review) (same).
74. On natural law, see Henry Mather, Natural Law and Liberalism, 52 S.C. L. REV.
331 (2001). Cf. Larry Cati Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism:An Introduction to a New
Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85 (2009) (discussing theocratic
Islam and its ideology as a part of law).
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assert such authority within the confines of its territory and the objects
controlled through it (corporations, for example, wherever they might
operate)-or a macro analysis-to speak to the marketplace for legal
rules within the broader regulatory sphere of worldwide production and
supply chains.75
B. Consequences for Theorizing CorporateCode Legalization.
The project of legalization of corporate codes provides some useful
clues about the direction of law as a system and the techniques through
which it will be manifested. Expressed as a project to embed corporate
codes within the current structures of the domestic legal orders of states
76
legalization poses a
by giving legal effect to societal governance,
of both the
integrity
for
the
contradictions
and
number of challenges
to be
meant
are
which
orders,
enterprise
societal
law-state and the
the
include
These
few.
a
just
highlight
me
Let
conjoined thereby.
misdirection of labeling (dismissing non-law as necessarily illegitimate),
the obliteration of the fundamental construct of and constraints
inherent in the corporate form, the error of conflating regulation with
law, the unintended consequence of subverting law through the
incorporation of a societal element in lawmaking, the error of
denaturing the societal element of corporate codes, and the production
of perversity through the formalism of law that masks inverted power
relations between powerful enterprises and weak states.
1. The First Challenge, of Course, Involves the Labeling Project of
Legalization.
Legalization and its promise of stability and legitimacy follows from
the judgment inherent in the descriptor-voluntary-usually attached
to corporate codes. This applies whether the codes are third-party public
or private efforts from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), U.N. Amnesty International, and so forth, or
whether they are the idiosyncratic product of an enterprise respecting
its supply chain. To label such codes as voluntary is possible only within
a regime that posits the model of law within the state as the highest
ideal of governance and the truest form of legitimate expression of
power-public, democratic, and bound by a domestic legal order that is

75. See generally Backer, supra note 28 (discussing complex governance concerning
corporations and governments creating laws).
76. See BECKERS, supra note 11, at 364-93.
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a world onto itself (though in communion with others of its kind).7 7
Codes are voluntary precisely because they are not law. But that
premise suggests codes as subordinate, contingent, and transitory and
thus deploys the premises of the underlying ideology to avoid
contention. Codes have the character they do precisely as a consequence
of the constraints that follow from the role they are assigned within the
law-state, that is they follow the natural logic of the ideological system
of the law-state, which itself remains unquestioned, and which views
such codes as peripheral to and incapable of functioning as law.7 8 Thus
"genuine legal obligations" may arise only within the tight space of
domestic legal orders, and governance that falls "beyond the law" does
so only because it is sourced in organizations other than those
established for that purpose within the state.7 9
Contemporary legal theorists start from this position that they
assume to be self-evident. And they are right to fear destabilizing the
underlying premises on which the supremacy of law, and of the power of
the state at the center of the project of legalization, is built. For them,
"expansive moves to represent law as present beyond the state, even as
having nothing to do with governing, leave us with a diminishing sense
of what law 'is."'"o That, perhaps, is one of the most powerful points
raised by what Jan Smits nicely describes as doctrine.81 What could be
more benign than the evolution of the fairly ordinary doctrines of
contract to embrace a regime of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
discipline through law? "In this respect, CSR Codes are only the next
type of document that contract law needs to accommodate." 82 Yet Smits

77. See, e.g., Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in European
Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9 ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. 12 (2005). See generally Adelle
Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001)
(reviewing self-regulatory corporate codes through the lenses of legal pluralism and
economic globalization).
78. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct
to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 395-96 (2005) (discussing codes made
by non-government actors).
79. See Ingo Venzke, Post-Modern Perspectives-on Orthodox Positivism (noting that
legal positivists recognize only one form of legal normativity-hard law; yet the issue that
Beckers raises quite correctly is the extent to which hard law is malleable even within its
own logic, is quite valuable), in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN

WORLD 182, 188-89 (Jorg Kammerhofer & Jean D'Aspremont, eds., 2014).
80. Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68
MOD. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).

81. See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private
Law, or: On the DiscipliningPower of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99
(2017).
82. Id. at 13.
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is effectively suggesting a societal function for law beyond itself. This is
one in which law itself is an instrument not bound up in its own logic
but embedded in the service of politics. Still, there is a self-reflexive
logic in that role, as Gunther Teubner suggests, especially in those
jurisdictions whose relationship between economics and politics
Teubner describes as "Coordinated Market Economies."83
"At the same time, we end up with a potentially restricted and
impoverished account of this larger field if we insist on approaching it
with understandings and a discourse that grew up around attempts to
84
introduce, justify, and understand processes of government." And yet,
the legalization project necessarily weakens that basic premise on which
the political order of states is now based. Embedding corporate codes
within the web of law necessarily sources law outside of the state,
though embedded within it. This development opens up the possibility
that law itself might be sourced without the state. Yet to open that
possibility itself undermines the disciplinary effect of law within the
legitimating organs of the state.
To legalize means to embed societal obligations, sometimes
expressed through contract and often through the substantive norms of
international standards, within domestic legal orders. Such embedding
requires application of the power of the state, constrained by the process
and substantive limits of the political order established with the
apparatus of government, expressed through a political constitution.
This is self-evident only because we remain unconscious of its limited
referent. What appears necessarily true may be true only because the
premises of the law-state are assumed without question as describing
the entire reality of law, that is, under conditions of the classical lawstate, where the identity of law and the state is assumed without
question.85 But where law may exist autonomously of the state, might
codes not also be conceived as genuine legal obligations, though not that
of the state, and not perhaps of a sort for which remedies might be
86
sought through the state? The answer increasingly appears to be yes.

83. See Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their
Enforcement Depends Upon the Difference Between ProductionRegimes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 81 (2017).
84. Roberts, supra note 80, at 3.
85. Cf. Backer, supra note 38, at 87 (explaining that the state's claim to a monopoly of
governance power is no longer plausible).
86. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1739, 1773-74 (2007).
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2. The Second Challenge Arises from the Characterof Corporations
and Their Relation to the Apparatus of Government and its Legal
Structures.
Under the premises of the classical law-state, and especially in
continental Europe, it is natural to speak of the corporation as a
creature of law, certainly as to its personality and its relation to the
apparatus of state.87 But that notion rests on the more profound idea
that the sole authentic and primal incarnation of communal will must
be the state, and that all other aggregations of communal will-from
corporations to social organizations-necessarily derive their license to
operate from the state.8 8 This is as true of concession theories as it is of
institutional or contract theories-in each case there is a network of
dependency, grounded in power hierarchies among the enterprise and
the state organs, which operates through the enactment and application
of law.8 9 In its extreme form, in European Marxist Leninist states, the
very idea of the corporate form apart from the state is itself
inconceivable-as is the case in contemporary Cuba.90 But even there,
things may be changing.9 1
This construction includes a critical wrinkle-the emphasis of the
fundamental aggregation of corporations as one focused on capital
rather than on the aggregation of social forces. This is the classic
formulation that brings together the fundamental tenets of both
classical capitalist and Marxist obsessions with capital and the
consequential idea that corporations are at heart "merely an
accumulation of capital." While these ideas serve the premises of the
classical law-state, they might become less compelling when the
premises of the law-state are removed. The reason, of course, is that the
classical theory of corporations assumes the subordination of the social
sphere to a political sphere occupied in its entirety by the apparatus of
87. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, (Mis)Conceptionsof the Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
731, 731 (2013).
88. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting
in part). See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the separation of ownership and
control within the modern corporation).
89. See, e.g., JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS 1-36 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads:
Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 365-75 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, The Cuban Communist Party at the Cusp of Change
(discussing the issues facing the Cuban Community Party "as it seeks to emerge as an
autonomous institutional force"), in REFORMING COMMUNISM: CUBA IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Scott Morgenstern and Jorge P6rez L6pez, eds.) (forthcoming 2017),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2711907.
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government. Once one presumes an organization based on capital and
dependent for legitimacy on a derogation of state power, everything else
follows. But that focus on political subordination and the primacy of
capital can both distort and constrain analysis. It both fails to consider
the autonomy of the social role of enterprises free of the ideology of
capital (in both its capitalist and Marxist senses) and fails to
understand the social costs of the subsidization of this construct,
including the construction and maintenance of corporate law itself.
And, indeed, one might think about the law of economic activityincluding laws governing corporations-as a species of the general effort
to manage societal behaviors. These societal behaviors can be
administered by the management of desire (implemented through the
legalization and prohibition of markets for certain products and
services), the controlling of markets, the controlling of popular demand
for certain goods, and the limiting of the choices that individuals can
make in interactions. 92 Perhaps Catholic social thought has hinted at a
distinct approach, but that too is only in its nascent stages of
development. 93 But this categorical management approach also
94
produces those "outlaw" enterprises whose operation lies beyond law.
Still, it is not inevitable that the insight of this approach will invariably
produce another rigid orthodoxy. Gunther Teubner rightly reminds us
that irrespective of the autonomy of the enterprise and its self-reflexive
95
governance, there is an inevitable intermeshing between systems. For
the lawyer, the variations on the political or societal "taste" for that
interaction and its expression produce distinct pathways to law. The
open question (and an important one for formalists) remains: it is
unclear whether the character of those interactions is legal, and
therefore embedded "inside" the state, or whether those interactions are
inter-structural, and therefore are maintained "outside" the state. The
answer to that question might be avoided-but not its effects. Is it still
useful to indulge an ideology grounded in the premise that the

92. Cf. DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CORPORATION (2007) (discussing the role of the corporation in the modern world).
93. See generally Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic
Social Thought, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 561 (2004) (discussing the core Catholic Social
Thought premises that go beyond the communitarian vision of the corporation).
94. See generally DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: JAPAN'S CRIMINAL
UNDERWORLD, 25TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (2012) (describing Japan's Yakuza gangsters
and their role in shaping society); LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED

CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE (2003) (explaining the Italian Mafia's influence on its communities);
PINO ARLACCHI, MAFIA BUSINESS: THE MAFIA ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

(Martin Ryle trans., 1986) (same).
95. See generally Teubner, supra note 83 (reviewing the interaction between private
corporate codes and public regulation).

136

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

24:1

corporation sits entirely inside the state and that therefore law can be
stretched to cover the whole of its activities and arrangements? The
answer is increasingly ambiguous, though the consequences of the
premise, for both state and corporation, may be profound.
3. The Third Challenge Suggests a Troublesome Relation Between
Law and the Legalization of Societal Space.
This challenge arises from the consequences of the fact, thought to
be natural and inevitable, that because corporate codes are regulatorybecause they imitate law-they assume an incursion into the political
sphere and thus necessarily must be absorbed in some way by the state
to ensure that these regulatory forays become law. Yet here, shifting
fundamental premises of law-state relations suggest that the problem
may well lie in trying to transform the societal dimension of governance
into a legal dimension (that is, into a state of transition to law) by using
the notion of regulatory intent or function as a bridge.9 6 One moves from
interlinking to intermeshing to amalgamation and transformation as an
inevitable process that is triggered by the determination of regulatory
intent. Outside of the classical parameters of the orthodox law-state, the
underlying premises of this approach are dangerous and erroneous. This
approach suggests that regulation is necessarily legal and thus within
the domain of the state. As a consequence, where such regulation
remains "private," that is, in the social or economic spheres, it is
97
necessarily incomplete and transitory.
But that can be true only under orthodox law-state theory. It does
not follow from other conceptions of the relationship of law to the state.
It is dangerous because the premise is itself grounded on the notion of
the right of the state to impose itself without limit in the social sphere.
Yet this power is itself belied by core notions of Western constitutional
ideology that are grounded in fundamental constraints on state power.9 8
And it is also contrary to notions of respect for belief communities and
their rights of self-governance, ideals not limited to religious
communities alone. Thus, for example, new foms of contract, specifically
governance contracts, may point to new forms of rights and duties but

96. See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 6.

97. See generally David Bilchitz, The Moral and Legal Necessity for a Business and
Human Rights Treaty, https://business-humanrights.orgsites/default/filesdocumentsffhe%20
Moral%20and%2OLegal%2ONecessity%2Ofor%20a%20Business%2Oand%2OHuman%20Rights%2(T
reaty/o20February/o202015%2FIiNAL%20FI'NALpdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (arguing in
favor of a movement toward the negotiation of a comprehensive Treaty on Business and
Human Rights and a move away from the U.N. Guiding Principles).
98. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 45, at 522-25.
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perhaps ones falling outside the state apparatus as readily as they
99
These
might be conceived as inevitably tending toward "the legal."
governance contracts reframe relations among contracting parties from
a transactional to a relational character, that is these develop
contractual relations the content of which imposes governance authority
on one or more of the parties; contracts of this sort may include many
corporate codes.100 The premise is not inevitable that societal
governance equals regulatory legality for which the intervention of the
state is required or preferred. Carl Schmitt's articulation of the
01
must give way to
claustrophobic world of parliamentary democracy
the realities of power shifting around the informal legislatures of the
enterprise organismus and its opponents. Those opponents, individuals,
are disembodied, aggregated, and reconstituted as nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in social space, but also interlinked with the
political spaces where their effects can be felt.

4. The Fourth Challenge Suggests that LegalizationProduces
Incoherence in the Legal Field, Weakening the Authority Both of
Law and of CorporateCodes.
This fourth challenge follows from the implications of social sphere
legislation but in two respects. The orthodox premises undergirding the
law-state, especially within Europe, require rejection of the notion of
102
To
any equivalence between societal and legal-political constitution.
suggest otherwise would invite subversion of the hierarchy of legitimacy
at the core of the law-state system. That legitimacy is, in turn, founded
on the primacy of the political sphere over the social, economic, and
cultural spheres, and on the supremacy of a territorially constituted
99. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS As CONNECTED

CONTRACTS 113-79 (Hugh

Collins ed., Michelle Everson trans., 2011). See generally Backer, supra note 25
(discussing "the impact of multinational corporations in the context of corporate social
responsibility as a regulatory policy framework").
100. See, Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
TransnationalRegulation, 14 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
499, 523 (2008).
101.

CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans.,

1985).
102. See generally DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:
FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY (1992) (arguing that rather than

define authoritarianism primarily by contrast to liberal democracy, we need to broaden
our conception of authoritarianism to include social control imposed by private
organizations and institutions); Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives
to State-Centered Constitutional Theory? (addressing how constitutional theory will adapt
its nation-state tradition in contemporary terms and redefine it), in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
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community to assert political will (through law) to order (using the
apparatus of the state) the economic, social, and cultural field.1 03
Boundaries between societal and political constitutionalism remain
important for the integrity of both. Yet the project of legalization might
well subvert this fundamental distinction even as it seeks to preserve it.
Where corporate codes are understood as species of legislative
privatization if focused on generalized societal interests, they are recharacterized as moving into the public sphere with the consequence
that they can only have authoritative effect if reconstituted as legal and
legislative.
Might this be an inversion of the old Marxist dictum that law is
politics is economics to something like economics is politics is law? Yet
to bring corporate codes "back home" into the state through the
mediating techniques of legalization might be to undo the very
foundation of the law-state system in two ways: First, it stretches the
meaning of law beyond the parameters within which it remains a
coherent subject of politics in the law-state system.1 04 What corporations
produce is not law, can never be law, and may well offend classically
understood notions of law. What corporations produce may be legalized,
but to call it law is to suggest that any act of power can, through the
expedient of legalization, affect the appearance and usurp the
authenticity of law-which within orthodox theory must be a product of
the state apparatus and sourced within its normative framework.
Second, it might make it possible to destabilize the core foundation of
the system by substituting powerful functionally differentiated actors
for the popular sovereign as the source of law. 05 Legalization of

103. It is in this sense that one can understand the legitimacy (if not the wisdom) of
deploying law to define an ethnicity through religious affiliation in part, see MALAY
CONST. art. 169, pt. XIII, or to control language (France); or even to recognize the
legitimacy of sub national groups-corporation, ethnicities, indigenous constitution,
religion and the like. Thus, for example, law now serves as the basis for legitimating the
indigenous status of groups in the United States (through recognition of tribal status, e.g.
MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL
ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS (2004)), to the regulation of marriage, and religious
affiliation (see generally JOSEPH CHINYONG Liow, PIETY AND POLITICS: ISLAMISM IN
CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA (2009) (discussing the Lina Joy case in an interesting way).
104. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of
Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & Soc'Y 192 (1993) (examining the success of legal pluralism in
the context of modern law); Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Pluralism:Past to
Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008) (analyzing in depth the history and
present reach of legal realism).
105. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3-4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996). See generally Gunther
Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus:Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443
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corporate codes effectively transfers the authority for lawmaking from
state to enterprise, and from the polity to the board of directors as
representatives of shareholders.
Worse, the undoing of the very foundation of the law -state system in
the two ways described above would undertake this subversion through
the techniques of judicialization of the legalization process. The
possibility of incoherence here is profound, as the tendency of quasijudicial bodies to engage in equity practice-to privilege the interest at
stake over legal or governance text-is now better understood. 0 6 And,
indeed, by stretching and contorting the interpretive processes of courts
to embed corporate codes without legislative action might itself threaten
the legislative power. Judicialization might then be used to avoid
legislation, where legislative action might otherwise have been needed
to operationalize (and legalize) codes, and by extension to permit the
courts to oversee, through judicial control of interpretation of these
corporate codes, the substance of these governance instruments. Thus
the legalization of corporate codes brings to the foreground the
fundamental issues of judicial authority within a democratic state, but
compounded: judicially managed legalized corporate codes produce a
legal system in which popular accountability becomes more remote.
These are problems not merely of definition but of normative effect.
Taken together, these problems create a conundrum for the law-stateit must legalize to preserve its coherence as a regulatory system, but it
may lose its coherence and legitimacy as a regulatory system if it
engages in this sort of legalization. The contradiction is fundamental in
the face of globalization. And it is one that arises precisely because the
tightly self-referential edifice of law-state legitimacy is built on the
foundation of a normative order that has lapsed to all respects with the
rise of globalization and the necessity of governance spaces beyond the
107
state.
The way out of the contradiction of legalization may require the
abandonment of the orthodox premises on which the law-state is
understood in the face of globalization. It is the state that will change in
(1992) (discussing the "question of how to reconstruct, in postmodern architecture, the
connections between the social and the legal [arenas]").
106. See, e.g., Christiane Gerstetter, The Appellate Body's 'esponse" to the Tensions
and InterdependenciesBetween Transitional Trade Governance and Social Regulation, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION, supra

note 33, at 111, 112-13.
107. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Economic GlobalizationAscendant and the Crisis
of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global
Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141 (2006) (discussing the connection between
globalization and "the crisis of the state and state system as the foundational form of
global political organization").

140

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:1

order to authoritatively embed the corporation within the political
sphere other than through its administrative regulatory apparatus (the
regulatory agencies through which such interactions have been
traditionally mediated in the modern administrative
state).
Alternatively, the law-state may retain its normative purity but shrink
in relevance, making way for other and additional, functionally
differentiated, nonterritorial, governance entities existing in a global
order in which the state, still of principal importance, is no longer the
only means of expressing ordering power.
5. The Fifth Challenge Touches on the Compatibility of Corporate
Codes and Law: Just as Law can be Understood as Political
Governance with Social and Economic Objectives (Even if the Latter
Is Merely to Structure Markets), So CorporateCodes Might Be
Understood as Economic Governance with Social and Political
Objectives Structured in Legal Form.
The systemic qualities of each system are similar. However, there
may be profound differences between systems in the extent of their
respective jurisdictions. 108 Both serve the same function-selfreferencing and self-constituting expressions of rule of law governance
among distinct communities
organized
through institutional
frameworks to represent the constituents that make up each
community. The power of both is enhanced through formal and informal
interlinkages that create webs of polycentric and partial governance
that might be felt distinctly across the supply chain and beyond the
territory of any particular place.109 That may well be the single most
important consequence of globalization-not chaos, but anarchy, order
without a center, and an ordering of rules in three-dimensional space. 110
The project of embedding through legalization presents substantial
and perhaps necessary opportunities that, if done well, might extend the
reach of the law-state while preserving its normative forms and
legitimacy. But doing it well might require a bit of self-control under
conditions of social differentiation where embedding can only be as
108. See generally Backer, supra note 86 (explaining Wal-Mart's role in "the
development of efficient systems of private law making by non-governmental
organization").
109. See generally Dan Wielsch, Private Governance of Knowledge: Societally-Crafted
Intellectual PropertiesRegimes, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 907 (2013) (discussing the
effects of the "incorporation of international intellectual property protection into the
framework of trade relations"); Teubner, supra note 30 (arguing "how corporate codes
feature functions, structures, and institutions of genuine constitutions").
110. See generally Backer, supra note 37 (explaining how societal constitutionalism can
be viewed as dynamic "in three dimensional governance space").
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incomplete as the regulatory reach of the corporate-code-enacting
enterprise or the reach of the international "soft law" norms they might
be made to embrace, first as norm, and then in a mandatory fashion
through legalization. And even then, there remain the difficulties of
overcoming what Mark Kawakami illustrates as the perverse effects of
the legalization of the societal sphere."' It can be done-but only by
112
And
legalizing the techniques of management as the forms of law.
that, itself, will fundamentally change the character of the enterprise.
Indeed, neither the power to regulate nor the acts producing
legalization can be understood, standing alone, as sufficient to support
systemicity among polycentric social and political subsystems that
themselves are fractured and interlinked in dynamic and partial ways.
Legalization does not speak to the coherence of the corporate codes of
Walmart, Nike, Zara, and Philips creating a connection with the
legalization in the European Union, the United States, China, and the
like, unless differentiation is understood solely as functional and not
normative. Legalization thus carries with it a harmonizing element that
may be as mandatory as the resulting legal liability of enterprises
within states. But that leaves the larger issue of differentiation.
Legalization, under conditions of the logic of the law-state, can reach
equilibrium only when all of these subsystems are knit together-one
way or another. But that process also threatens the law-state by
suggesting that it no longer sits at the apex of power and that
democratic theory ends at national borders, which remain quite open to
projections of legalized power from abroad.

6. The Sixth Challenge Involves the Consequences of the
Legalization Project: Legalization Does Not Prevent, and Might
Even Encourage, Certain Perversitiesthat, While Maintainingthe
Elegance of the Formal Structures of Legalization Within the
Apparatusof the State, Effectively Permit Further Underminingof
State Power.
The project of legalization can be understood, in some sense, as an
effort to manage one of the great consequences of economic

111. See generally Mark T. Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law
Crowds Out and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147 (2017) (analyzing the
crowding out effect and the spillover effect that comes with legalizing otherwise voluntary
norms).
112. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, AND POPULATION, LECTURES AT
THE COLLPGE DE FRANCE 1977-78 227-316 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans.,
2007).
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globalization-the appearance of governance gaps that threaten the
coherence and authority of traditional systems of politics and controlthrough law. 113 Indeed, at the international level, the recognition of
these governance gaps, and their threat to the state order, might be
understood as a great impetus to contemporary movement to develop,
for example, integrated theories of regulation.1 14 And to that extent
there is little disagreement about the need for a regulatory or
governance structure, even as this essay suggests, there is no consensus
about its conceptual foundation or operationalization.
This essay has suggested points of dread, of disquiet, in the context
of the search for "solutions" to this problem. It raises a final one herethat of the perversities of approaches that stress or are grounded in the
formalism of law. That is, there is a danger in the embrace of what are
the essentially Rechtstaat principles underlying legalization that may
well undo the very project that legalization's fidelity to Rechsstaat seeks
to advance. The system of legalization itself must be grounded in certain
core principles that support the state system-the equality of states, the
subordination of private to public power, the democratic principle of
exercises of state power through law, and the normative (Sozialstaat)
principles through which law itself is constrained.1 15 But the formalities
of law itself, as a system, may be subverted through law, especially
where the principles that underlie the state system on which it is based
are weakened. And economic globalization has served to weaken those
foundations in substantial ways. The result is that a fidelity to
legalization through law may produce a formal veil behind which
powerful actors-multinational enterprises and developed states-use
the forms of domestic lawmaking to assert their own will in states
through law.
The consequences for state authority in the aftermath of the Rana
Plaza factory building collapse provide a glimpse of these possible
futures." 6 Two events are particularly worth noting. In the first, and

113. See, e.g., JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-36 (2013).
114. See, e.g., SURYA DEvA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
HUMANIZING BUSINESS 176-99 (2012). See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS
IN
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
AND CORPORATE SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY:

INTERNATIONAL LAw (2006) (explaining how international law is criticized for being illequipped to deal with the challenges of globalization).
115. See generally Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment, 53
S.M.U. L. REV. 477 (2000) (analyzing the effect of the Basic Law, the German constitution
created after World War II, and its impact on the political scene of Germany).
116. See generally Backer, supra note 13 (examining "the Rana Plaza factory building
collapse and its aftermath as the starting point for theorizing systemicity in the emerging
interlocking systems of national, private and international governance orders.").
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within weeks of the factory building collapse, the United States and the
European Union, in a coordinated effort linked to the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), began a process that culminated in the
insistence that Bangladesh adopt a series of legal reforms that were
acceptable to the United States and the European Union and which
conformed to international consensus standards. Failure to adopt these
legal reforms would imperil the advantageous trade arrangements
between the United States, the European Union, and Bangladesh. In
the second, and also quite quickly after the building collapse, a
substantial number of multinational enterprises with downstream
supply chain operations in Bangladesh organized themselves into two
collectives, which thereafter developed new standards for building and
safety inspection, worked with the Bangladesh government in
transposing these into domestic law, financed local development in
conformity with the standards, and oversaw training and inspection
programs. These were all worthy efforts, no doubt. And they were
effected through the deployment of the formal mechanisms of
legalization-of working within or through the government of
Bangladesh and its legal structures. But the effect of these actions were
perverse-it is not clear what sort of autonomous sovereign authority
Bangladesh could assert beyond making its formalities of legalization
through national law available to supranational actors, public and
private.
And thus this last point may lead one to understand the project of
legalization and its promotion of law and the state, as a political
incarnation of pathos, one that might be particularly poignant in the
face of the post-1945 efforts to a community of states equal in their
mutual relations. It suggests that even at its most successful, this is a
project that reinforces the authority of the most developed states, their
political integrity, and the coherence and supremacy of their domestic
legal orders. For other states, a condition of increasing dependency is
the perverse effect of the logic of the national legalization of
transnational corporate codes. It serves effectively to promote regimes
that more and more aggressively extraterritorialize and internationalize
law, which is then projected into those states that host the lower levels
of global production chains. It preserves the state system for the service
of its most powerful members. And it suggests, as well, that the
formalism of legalization can serve as a veil through which the
multinational enterprise might govern in a territory through its
and
the traditional
states-reversing
within
power
effective
fundamental ordering relationship between political and economic
power that serves as the foundational justification of the legalization
project itself. Where powerful companies can use their power to control
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the domestic legal order of weak states, the legalization projects
evidences its greatest possible inversion.
III. A CONCLUSION THAT IS ALSO A BEGINNING.

The twentieth century was the great period of the instrumental lawstate as the center of primal authority over a political sphere that was
deemed dominant over the social and economic (and to some extent the
religious) spheres. The twenty-first century may see exposed a
revolution in ideology, now masked by the power of old patterns, that
makes a classical legal imprimatur less relevant for stability or
authenticity of governance. The unmasking of the new may come when
the project of expanding the meaning, content, and sources of law (the
project of legalization) becomes so broad that it itself becomes
meaningless and the new categories that lie beneath it become better
exposed. What those are we have only the slightest of clues at the
moment. But it is clear that the new world order involves the
refracture"17 of power and a more polymorphous and heterodox system
of hopefully coherent systems of rules that bind, sometimes like law and
sometimes not.
If corporate codes are regulatory and socially embedded, then they
function politically. To that extent-to the extent of the political function
of societal embedding-legalizationis necessary to embed codes into the
state. So embedded, they can be stabilized and authenticated-as law,
as bridges between societal and economic spheres, as structural
coupling, as a means of imposing coherence on multi-governance
systems, etc.' 18 If corporate codes are understood as political in this
fashion, they must be expressed in the only way open for such
expression, by a legality that itself is an expression of and permission
from state power. This is the necessary logic one can extract from the
normative grundnorms of the law-state system that posits the state at
the center of law. That is the approach, from a perspective of a culture
of political economy, that Gunther Teubner quite usefully identifies as
coordinated market economies."1 9

117. It must be emphasized that is fracture both returns law systems to an earlier state
in the sense that the unique connection between law and the state is broken, but also as a
new state because fracture does not produce a reversi6n to feudalism but an advance
toward globalized communities. See discusison at text and notes 39-40.
118. I am reminded here, in an ironic way, of JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 104-18
(William Rehg, trans., 1996).
119. See Teubner, supranote 83, at 8.
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Yet the embrace of this approach, the application of this political
culture in practice, produces contradiction of the highest order. That
application, if undertaken faithfully, also requires a modification of
state legality that is itself problematic because it recognizes a source of
law-generating power beyond its own apparatus (the government),
without popular constraint, and only partially within its control. The
necessity of legalization presents its own dangers. And it might well be
that in the process, Aristotle's suggestion that the forms of legalization
will long outlive the revolution that such actions usher in may be a
consequence that only our children will live long enough to
appreciate. 120 This essay has suggested a general approach to
understanding those difficulties and contradictions-that is, the
problem posed by the embrace of a normative system whose embedding
threatens the theoretical coherence of the system of the law-state itself.
If democracy constrained by legality is at the heart of the definition of
the liberal state, 121 and of all systems constrained by normative political
constraints, 122 then legality beyond democracy presents a fundamental
problem for the state. Indeed, the expansion of the concept of law as a
political instrument to include the codes of enterprises reconstitutes the
basis of state sovereignty, perhaps to ill effect. Or the legalization of the
societal sphere may eventually transform the state into a nexus point
for power relationships beyond the political. In either case, the project of
legalization poses a radical challenge to law, to the state, and to the
constitution of enterprise governance within functionally differentiated
global governance systems.
The project Beckers so brilliantly describes might, if successful, do
more to unmake the state than any sort of societally based and deeply
intermeshed system of societal governance effectuated through nonstate
enterprises. The project uses the tools of the state and its principles of
law to unmake itself and the law under which its internal political
economy has been maintained in more or less stable form since the
beginning of the modern era. Just as that era was founded on the
decapitation of the heads of the monarchs of the most well-developed
state of the time, so too will the transformation of law, its decapitation

120. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS. BOOKS V AND VI (David Keyt trans., 1999)
(addressing the question of how to construct lasting democracies).
121. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)
(arguing for a liberal state based on pragmatic theories of government).
122. See generally Larry Cati Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On
ConstitutionalValues and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System,
30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331 (2012) (explaining that in order to understand Chinese
constitutionalism, we must look beyond the written constitution and consider the divisions
of power).
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in the service of itself, also usher in an age of the globalized state. 123 In
this new age, the state will preserve the forms of law, even as it becomes
more deeply embedded in the structures of global production for which
it serves, increasingly, as a means of protecting order.

123. See generally Matthias Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King: Past,
Present, and Future Approaches to International Soft Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 335
(2012) (suggesting that the concept of international law should be dissociated from the
concept of public authority).

